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I. INTRODUCTION
The anomalous nature of punitive or exemplary damage awards in
civil cases has often been the subject of comment in English
jurisprudence and in the decisions of courts in other common law
jurisdictions within the British Commonwealth. Thus, in the leading
opinion of the House of Lords decision in Rookes v. Barnard,2 Lord
Devlin observed that the recognition of punitive damages, which he
favored to a limited degree, involved “admitting into the civil law a

*
2.

Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
[1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.).
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principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal.”3 The lack of
procedural safeguards normally associated with punishment, the
enrichment of the plaintiff rather than the state by the imposition of a
civil fine, and the inherent difficulty of quantifying such awards with
resulting doctrinal uncertainty have conspired, in the English tradition at
least, to justify caution and restraint in the making of such awards.
Indeed, in Rookes v. Barnard itself, the English law of punitive damages
approached the brink of extinction. Such awards were preserved in that
case for application only in tort law and essentially in only two types of
cases. The first type included claims arising from oppressive, arbitrary,
or unconstitutional acts of public servants, or, as Lord Devlin described
it, “the arbitrary and outrageous use of executive power.”4 The second
type of cases included those in which the defendant’s conduct was
calculated to make a profit that exceeded the compensation available to
the plaintiff.5 Until quite recently, the rules set forth in Rookes v.
Barnard settled the boundaries for punitive damage awards in English
law.
At the same time, however, some support for the making of such
awards can be found. Lord Devlin himself expressed the view that
punitive damage awards played a very useful role in the two categories
of cases identified in Rookes v. Barnard.6 Further, the restriction of
English awards to these two categories of cases has attracted criticism
over the years. More particularly, the English Law Commission, in its
report entitled Aggravated, Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages,
recommended a much broader potential availability of such awards in
the context of tort law and in claims arising from equitable wrongdoing.7
Even for such enthusiasts, however, the extension of damage awards into
the context of claims for damages for breach of contract, where no tort
has been committed, have typically been considered to be beyond the
pale.
Thus, the Law Commission itself recommended against extending
awards of punitive damages into the contractual context. The Commission
offered a number of reasons in support of this recommendation, some more
convincing, one might think, than others. Thus, “a contract is a private
3. Id. at 1226.
4. Id. at 1223; see also Cassell & Co. v. Broome, [1972] A.C. 1027, 1077–78
(H.L.) (noting that the doctrine also applies to police and other local authorities
improperly exercising rights of search or arrest without warrant).
5. Rookes, [1964] A.C. at 1226.
6. Id.
7. LAW COMM’N, AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES
184–88 (1997) [hereinafter AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES].
For a critical assessment, see Peter Jaffey, The Law Commission Report on Aggravated,
Exemplary and Restitutionary Damages, 61 MOD. L. REV. 860 (1998).
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arrangement in which parties negotiate rights and duties, whereas the
duties which obtain under the law of tort are imposed by law; it can
accordingly be argued that the notion of state punishment is more readily
applicable to the latter than to the former.”8 It further argued that “the
need for certainty is perceived to be greater in relation to contract than
tort,” thus rendering the discretionary features of exemplary damage
awards unattractive.9 The Commission noted that exemplary damages
had never been awarded for breach of contract in the past, that the
awarding of exemplary damages would tend to discourage efficient
breach of contract, and that contract, unlike tort law, typically involved
pecuniary rather than nonpecuniary losses with respect to which
exemplary awards were less appropriate.10
Other considerations may be thought to weigh against punitive
damages in contract. It can be argued that, to the extent that punitive
damage awards punish defendants who have inflicted anxiety and other
mental suffering on plaintiffs, such injuries can be more directly and
appropriately addressed by awards of compensatory damages relating to
such injuries. Farnsworth suggests that American courts also exhibit a
reluctance to grant awards of punitive damages in the context of pure
contractual breach, and offers the proposition that damages for breach of
contract are essentially compensatory in nature as an explanation for this
phenomenon.11
Against this background, it may occasion some surprise, even to
Canadian observers, that the Supreme Court of Canada has blessed, in
recent years, punitive damages awards in pure breach of contract cases.
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this development in its recent and leading
decision in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co.12 As the majority opinion of
the Court noted in that case: “Critics of punitive damages warn against
an ‘Americanization’ of our law that, if adopted, would bring the
administration of justice in this country into disrepute.”13 Indeed, it is
probably true that quite apart from specialists with a particular interest in
this topic, Canadians more generally have an impression of American
experience with punitive damages awards that is not viewed altogether
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 7, at 118.
Id.
Id.
3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 194–98 (3d ed. 2004).
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 596.
Id. at 618–19 (per Binnie, J.).
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favorably. Canadian appreciation of American experience results, no
doubt, in large measure from media coverage of high-profile American
cases. Many readers of the Canadian daily press would be aware, for
example, of the 1994 award in the Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants,
P.T.S., Inc., where an Alabama jury awarded the plaintiff $2.7 million in
punitive damages at trial.14 The plaintiff had suffered burns from
opening a cup of scaldingly hot McDonald’s coffee and spilling it on her
lap in the front seat of an automobile.15 The fact that the trial judge
reduced the jury award to a much less impressive $480,00016 would not
have significantly reduced its impact on a Canadian reader as evidence
of a legal system out of control.
Often these cases have had a Canadian dimension. The remarkable result
in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.17 led the defendant Texaco to liquidate its
interest in its Canadian subsidiary, Texaco Canada, in order to pay the
award. Canadian opera fans were temporarily distressed by the loss of
Texaco Canada’s sponsorship of a favorite Saturday afternoon radio
program. A Canadian funeral home chain, the Loewen Group, Inc., was
brought close to insolvency in 1996 by a $500 million award in punitive
damages granted by a Mississippi jury.18 The claim concerned Loewen’s
alleged refusal to perform an agreement to buy two funeral homes from
the former Mayor of Biloxi.19 The properties in question had a value of
approximately $8.5 million. To avoid bankruptcy, the Loewen Group
eventually settled the claim for an amount variously reported in the
range of $150 to $175 million.20
Accordingly, it is not surprising that, in Pilot Insurance, the Supreme
Court of Canada acknowledged that Canadian critics of punitive
damages awards draw support from their understanding, or perhaps
14. No. CV-93-02419, 1995 WL 360309, at *1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994). This
case, together with BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996), were
referred to by Justice Binnie as decisions relied upon by critics of the American law on
punitive damages. See Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 618.
15. See Debra Lyn Bassett, “I Lost at Trial—In the Court of Appeals!”: The
Expanding Power of the Federal Appellate Courts to Reexamine Facts, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 1129, 1179 n.315 (2001) (discussing the facts of Liebeck, 1995 WL 360309).
16. Id.
17. See 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding that comity prevents federal courts from
blocking a state judgment awarding punitive damages); see also Comment, Texaco Inc.
v. Pennzoil Co.: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Federal Court Power Over State Court
Proceedings, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 767 (1986) (providing analysis of the federalism
issue raised by Pennzoil); JAMES SHANNON, TEXACO AND THE $10 BILLION JURY (1988).
18. The case is described in MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION,
AND INCOMPETENCE ON THE BENCH 158–59 (1998). See also Jonathan Harr, The Burial,
NEW YORKER, Nov. 1, 1999, at 70; Barrie McKenna, Loewen Action Called a Threat to
U.S. Justice, CAN. BUS., Nov. 25, 1998, at B7 (providing description of settlement).
19. BOOT, supra note 18, at 158.
20. Id. at 159.
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misunderstanding, of American experience. It is also not surprising that
in this case the Supreme Court attempted to craft an approach to the
awarding of punitive damages that would avoid the worst excesses of
American experience. As we shall see, however, whether the Court
succeeded in attaining that laudable objective remains, as yet, unclear.
II. RECOGNITION
The unlikely story of the Canadian embrace of punitive damages for
breach of contract arose in the context of wrongful dismissal cases, and,
more particularly, in the context of dismissal with an imputation. In an
employment contract of indefinite duration there is, of course, an
implied term requiring the employer to give reasonable notice to the
employee of an impending dismissal. Thus, in the typical wrongful
dismissal case, the employee who has not received reasonable notice
sues for damages for breach of that implied term. Where the wrongful
dismissal is accompanied with false allegations of employee misconduct
or other forms of harassment, the courts may consider awarding
additional damages to an employee who claims to have been injured by
conduct of this kind. The traditional response of English law, followed
until recent years in common law Canada, was that no such damages
claim was available on a breach of contract theory. In the 1909 decision
in Addis v. Gramophone Co., the House of Lords held that, in a wrongful
dismissal claim, no compensation can be awarded for the manner of
dismissal.21 To the extent that the employee had suffered injuries as a
result of, for example, defamation, the employee should be left with
whatever tort remedies might be available.22
The novel idea that punitive damages might be awarded in the
wrongful dismissal context appears to have been first mooted in a
decision of Justice Linden—perhaps by no coincidence, one of Canada’s
leading torts scholars23—in Brown v. Waterloo Regional Board of
Commissioners of Police.24 Justice Linden opined that although exemplary
damages for breach of contract were not available in the particular
circumstances of the case, there was no general rule against awarding

21. [1909] A.C. 488 (H.L.).
22. Id.
23. ALLEN M. LINDEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW (7th ed. 2001).
24. [1982] 136 D.L.R. (3d) 49 (Ont. High Ct.) vard [1983] 150 D.L.R. (3d) 729
(Ont. C.A.).
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such damages.25 The point was taken up by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Vorvis v. Insurance Corp.26 in 1989. The Court again offered
the view that although such an award would be inappropriate on the facts
of that case, punitive damages could indeed be awarded in the context of
a claim for breach of contract damages.27
The claim in Vorvis was for a wrongful dismissal. The plaintiff lawyer
was abruptly terminated by his employer, a government automobile
insurance plan, without cause and without reasonable notice. Prior to the
dismissal, the plaintiff’s supervisor, who considered the plaintiff to be
conscientious to a fault, engaged in detailed and, perhaps, heavy-handed
supervision of the plaintiff’s work.28 In addition to claiming wages that
he would have earned during a reasonable notice period, the plaintiff
sought aggravated and punitive damages.29 The Supreme Court majority
held that “while it may be very unusual to do so, punitive damages may
be awarded in cases of breach of contract.”30 For such an award to be
appropriate, the conduct of the defaulting party must be “of such a
nature as to be deserving of punishment because of its harsh, vindictive,
reprehensible and malicious nature.”31 Again, “the conduct must be
extreme in its nature and such that by any reasonable standard it is
deserving of full condemnation and punishment.”32 However, although
the facts of the case indicated that the supervisor had treated the plaintiff
“in a most offensive manner,”33 the conduct was not of such a nature as
to justify an award of punitive damages.34
Three aspects of the Court’s reasoning in the Vorvis case are of a
particular interest in the present context. First, the majority opinion of
Justice McIntyre indicated a clear awareness of the anomalous or
“peculiar” nature of punitive damages awarded “in the absence of the
procedural protections for the defendant [which are] always present in
criminal trials where punishment is ordinarily awarded . . . .”35 Further,
Justice McIntyre indicated an awareness of the problematic aspects of
extending punitive damages awards from their then existing home of tort
actions to breach of contract cases. In a tort case, the defendant is
“under a legal duty to use care not to injure his neighbour, and the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

1496

Id. at 61, 66.
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085.
Id. at 1086–87.
Id. at 1085.
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1107–08.
Id. at 1108.
Id. at 1107.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1104.

MCCAMUS.DOC

[VOL. 41: 1491, 2004]

8/21/2019 11:56 AM

Prometheus Bound or Loose Cannon?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

neighbour has in law a right not to be so injured and an additional right
to compensation where injury occurs.”36 On the other hand,
. . . In an action based on a breach of contract, the only link between the
parties for the purpose of defining their rights and obligations is the contract.
Where the defendant has breached the contract, the remedies open to the
plaintiff must arise from that contractual relationship, that ‘private law’, which
the parties agreed to accept.37

However, Justice McIntyre opined that the distinction between the
nature of tortious liability and liability for breach of contract did not
provide a reason to refuse extending punitive damages into the latter
context. Rather, it served as a basis for surmising that an award of
punitive damages would be “very rare in contract cases.”38 Beyond the
suggestion that the difference between the two forms of liability did not
preclude the punitive damages awards in the contractual context, the
Court offered no reasoned explanation for the proposition that punitive
damages should be extended into the purely contractual arena.
Presumably, the Court felt that it was necessary or desirable to do so in
order to provide a disincentive for conduct that, although “harsh,
vindictive, reprehensible and malicious,”39 is not tortious in nature.
Second, Justice McIntyre’s reason for declining to award punitive
damages on the facts of Vorvis, though clearly expressed and quite
defensible, has created a trail of confusion in subsequent cases. Justice
McIntyre was of the view that the heavy-handed supervision exercised
by the plaintiff’s supervisor was not “sufficiently offensive, standing
alone, to constitute actionable wrong . . . .”40 Justice McIntyre indicated
that the only basis for the imposition of punishment “must be a finding
of the commission of an actionable wrong which caused the injury
complained of by the plaintiff.”41 Such an approach, as Justice McIntyre
noted, was consistent with the American rule that awarded punitive
damages in a contract case only when the breach of contract also
constituted a tort for which punitive damages would be recoverable.42
The supervisor’s heavy-handed supervision appeared to be neither
tortious nor a breach of any term of the employment contract. More
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1107.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1107–08.
Id. at 1110.
Id. at 1106.
Id. (referring to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981)).
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particularly, it appears that Justice McIntyre considered that this conduct
did not constitute a breach of the term requiring the employer to give
reasonable notice of termination.
This reasoning appears unexceptionable. Justice McIntyre was simply
reiterating the proposition that in the absence of a breach of a duty of
some kind, punitive damages cannot be awarded. In subsequent cases,
however, it has been assumed by courts, including the Supreme Court of
Canada, that Justice McIntyre simply precluded the possibility that
punitive damages could ever be awarded for the offensive manner in
which a notice of dismissal is effected. Further, later courts have
struggled with the notion of whether an award of punitive damages is
permissible, then, only where there exists an independent “actionable
wrong” other than the principal breach of contract with respect to which
damages are claimed. The answer to this question, surely, should be that
if the principal breach of contract in issue is sufficiently offensive in
nature, the holding in Vorvis suggests that punitive damages would be
available, notwithstanding the absence of any additional breach of duty,
whether tortious or contractual. The problem, as Justice McIntyre saw it
in Vorvis, was that the offensive conduct allegations related to the
manner of supervision leading up to the decision to dismiss, rather than
to the manner in which the employer breached the reasonable notice
requirement. While it may be difficult to imagine circumstances where
the manner of giving unreasonable notice is so offensive as to warrant an
award of punitive damages, nothing in the reasoning of Justice McIntyre
in Vorvis precludes this possibility.
The third point of interest is the approach taken to the same issue by
Justice Wilson who, in her dissent on this point, would have awarded
punitive damages. Justice Wilson disagreed with what she characterized
as Justice McIntyre’s view that “punitive damages can only be awarded
when the misconduct is in itself an ‘actionable wrong.’”43 Rather, in her
view, “the correct approach is to assess the conduct in the context of all
the circumstances and determine whether it is deserving of punishment
because of its shockingly harsh, vindictive, reprehensible or malicious
nature.”44 On the present facts, the employer had engaged in “reprehensible
conduct . . . towards a sensitive, dedicated and conscientious employee.
The appellant was harassed and humiliated and . . . ultimately dismissed
for no cause after a sustained period of such treatment.”45 Thus, Justice
Wilson appears to be suggesting that even in the absence of a breach of
duty, whether tortious or contractual, punitive damages may be awarded.
43.
44.
45.
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Another plausible interpretation of her view, however, is that the
humiliating nature of the dismissal notice renders the breach of the
requirement to give reasonable notice a sufficiently offensive character
to attract an award of punitive damages. However, one might object to
this interpretation of Justice Wilson’s views by arguing that Justice
Wilson did not draw a clear distinction between the conduct leading up
to the decision to dismiss and the manner of the dismissal itself, a
distinction which is implicit in Justice McIntyre’s reasoning, and which
does appear to ground his decision.
Subsequently, Canadian courts have taken the view that the Vorvis
decision does require that in addition to finding that a principal breach of
contract sounding in damages has occurred, one must find, in order to
grant an award of punitive damages, that the offensive conduct constitutes a
separate actionable wrong in the form of either tortious misconduct or an
additional breach of contract.46 Indeed, in the particular context of
wrongful dismissal, the Supreme Court of Canada expressed the view
that punitive damages cannot be awarded with respect to an offensive
manner of giving termination notice on the theory that punitive damages
can only be awarded where there is, in addition to the failure to give
reasonable notice, a separate actionable wrong.
In Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd.,47 the Court affirmed this
view, however it further held that an employer who engages in “callous
and insensitive treatment”48 in dismissing an employee, though not liable
for punitive damages, may attract liability in the form of an extension of
the required reasonable notice period.49 This is so, in the Court’s view,
even though the misconduct cannot be held to be a breach of an implied
term to dismiss only in good faith. Such a term, in the majority’s view,
should not be implied into the employment contract as it would
46. See, e.g., Marshall v. Watson Wyatt & Co., [2002] 209 D.L.R. (4th) 411, 426
(Ont. C.A.); Schimp v. RCR Catering Ltd., [2004] 236 D.L.R. (4th) 461, 480–81
(N.S.C.A.). In New Brunswick, however, this confusion has been cleared up by
legislation providing that in a claim for “aggravated, exemplary or punitive damages, it
is not necessary that the matter in respect of which those damages are claimed be an
actionable wrong independent of the alleged wrong for which the proceedings are
brought.” Law Reform Act, R.S.N.B., Ch. L-1.2, § .3(1) (1993) (Can.).
47. [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 705.
48. Id. at 740. Justice Iacobucci further characterized such conduct as “bad faith
conduct in the manner of dismissal,” and offered as illustrations thereof “conduct that is
unfair or is in bad faith by being, for example, untruthful, misleading or unduly
insensitive.” Id. at 740, 743.
49. Id. at 705.
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constitute an undesirable fetter on the employer’s capacity to dismiss
without cause and upon reasonable notice.50 Thus, at least in the
wrongful dismissal context, the Court appears to have taken the rather
surprising view that even in the absence of a breach of duty, be it
tortious or contractual, compensation can be awarded. In a vigorous
dissent, Justice McLachlin suggested that a clearer and sounder approach
would be to hold that a term is to be implied in the employment contract
that the employer must not engage in such conduct. The breach of such
term could thus clearly and directly lead to an award of damages,
including potentially, punitive damages.51
To some extent, these difficulties arise from a failure to draw a clear
distinction between the manner in which the decision to dismiss is
reached as opposed to the manner of the dismissal itself. The approach
that Justice McLachlin advocated in her dissent avoids the confusion that
results from this deficiency by implying a term, which imposes
obligations of good faith conduct relating to the dismissal of an
employee.52 Calculation of the notice period, for Justice McLachlin,
then, can be and should be restricted to an assessment of those factors,
including the manner of dismissal, that may have an impact on the
“difficulty of finding replacement employment.”53
In the majority view, however, the Canadian law of wrongful dismissal
appears now to have reached the position where punitive damages
relating to the manner of dismissal are not available. Nevertheless,
curiously, an employer who behaves in a “callous and insensitive”
manner relating to the dismissal of an employee is vulnerable to an
extension of the period of reasonable notice period, even though the
conduct in question may not, in itself, constitute a breach of either
tortious or contractual duties. Damages awarded on this basis appear to
constitute punitive damages for wrongful dismissal by another name.54
50. Id.
51. Id. at 748–49, 757, 762–64.
52. See id. at 762 (placing reliance on academic commentary supporting the
recognition of an implied term of this kind); see, e.g., Randall B. Schai, Aggravated
Damages and the Employment Contract, 55 SASK. L. REV. 345 (1991) (suggesting that
the addition of an implied condition of good faith to employment contracts would align
such agreements with modern realities); Geoffrey England, Recent Developments in the
Law of the Employment Contract: Continuing Tension Between the Rights Paradigm and
the Efficiency Paradigm, 20 QUEEN’S L.J. 557 (1995) (observing that lack of empirical
research on the effect of lengthening the notice period in dismissal cases hampers judges
from effectively balancing the rights of employees with the employer’s efficiency
concerns).
53. Wallace, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at 751.
54. In the wake of Wallace, several Canadian courts have awarded damages
calculated on the basis of an extended notice period in order to reflect harsh treatment in the
manner of dismissal. See, e.g., Cassady v. Wyeth-Ayerst Can. Inc., [1998] 163 D.L.R.
(4th) 1, 12 (B.C.C.A.); Montague v. Bank of N.S., [2004] 69 O.R. (3d) 87, 94 (Ont. C.A.).
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Putting to one side the unsatisfactory complexities of the current
Canadian law on wrongful dismissal, it was clearly accepted that, as a
result of the decision in Vorvis, punitive damages had become
potentially available in Canadian law for breach of contract. It was only
in the later decision in Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co.,55 however, that the
Supreme Court of Canada actually approved an award of this kind. In
this case, the Court upheld an award of $1 million in punitive damages
against a defendant insurer who had breached its implied contractual
duty to handle claims by an insured in such fashion as to meet a standard
of good faith and fair dealing.56 The defendant had conceded that it had
breached this duty on the facts of this case.57
The facts were propitious for a punitive damages claim.58 The claimant’s
home had been destroyed by an accidental fire. The claim under her
insurance policy with the defendant was met with skepticism and,
ultimately, indefensibly harsh treatment. Indeed, over advice to the contrary
of an independent insurance adjuster, the insurance industry’s Crime
Prevention Bureau, the fire department, and an engineering expert and a
firefighter, both retained by the defendant insurer, the defendant persisted in
the view that the fire resulted from arson committed by the plaintiff and
her husband.59 Acting on this theory, the insurer terminated interim
payments to the claimant, being well aware that the plaintiff and her
husband were in precarious financial circumstances, in an apparent
attempt to coerce an unfairly low settlement amount.60 Further, the
defendant forced the claimant to litigate her claim at an estimated cost of
$320,000.61 At trial, the jury awarded approximately $318,252 in
compensatory damages and an additional amount of $1 million as
punitive damages.62 The Ontario Court of Appeal reduced the punitive
damage award to $100,000, though one dissenting member of the panel
would have dismissed the appeal.63
However, on further appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada restored the
jury award. Characterizing the conduct of the defendant insurer as that
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

[2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 596.
Id. at 596–97.
Id. at 604, 608.
Id. at 596.
Id. at 605–08, 611.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 604, 614–15.
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of having “behaved abominably”64 the Court had no difficulty in finding
that the defendant had behaved in a “malicious, oppressive and highhanded” manner that “offends the court’s sense of decency.”65 On this
occasion, however, the Court engaged in an extended analysis of the
history and purposes of the punitive damages awards. This led the Court
to offer a series of conclusions concerning the general nature and role of
the punitive damages award. On behalf of the majority, Justice Binnie
stated that “[p]unishment is a legitimate objective not only of the
criminal law but of the civil law,”66 and that punitive damages “serve a
need that is not met either by the pure civil law or the pure criminal
law.”67 Thus, in the present case, only the claimant could be rationally
expected to invest $320,000 of costs in the attempt to prove that the
defendant had acted in bad faith. An award that undoubtedly
overcompensates the plaintiff is given “in exchange for this socially
useful service.”68
After a lengthy survey of developments in England, Australia, New
Zealand, Ireland, and the United States, Justice Binnie concluded that
the English attempt to limit punitive damages by “categories” did not
work and had been rightly rejected by Canadian courts.69 Further, he
indicated that there exists a “substantial consensus” that the general
objectives that punitive damages serve are retribution, deterrence of the
wrongdoer and others, and denunciation.70 Additionally, while conceding
that the primary punishment vehicle is the criminal law and that successful
prosecution had in some jurisdictions been held to preclude punitive
damages, Justice Binnie thought that prior punishment for the defendant’s
misconduct in issue should be considered merely another factor in
making a punitive damages award, “albeit a factor of potentially great
importance.”71 Further, Justice Binnie expressed the view that the
incantation of “time-honoured pejoratives, (‘high-handed’, ‘oppressive’,
‘vindictive’, etc.) provide[d] insufficient guidance . . . .”72 In formulating
more satisfactory guidance in making such awards, emphasis was to be
placed, in his view, on the need to promote rationality, proportionality, and
sensitivity to the particular circumstances of the case.73 Finally, he
suggested that it may be rational to employ a punitive damages award to
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
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relieve a wrongdoer of its profit.74 As we shall see, Justice Binnie
returned to a number of these themes in attempting to fashion a set of
control mechanisms that are intended to preclude the making of
excessive punitive damages awards.
While the majority’s analysis admirably set the stage for the attempt to
craft limitations on the punitive damages awards, less analytical rigor
was applied to the question whether such awards ought to be extended
beyond tort to the pure contractual breach context. The majority essentially
adopted the view that the Court had previously settled the matter in the
Vorvis case.75 Unfortunately, however, the Court perpetuated the notion
that had plagued reasoning in the lower courts after Vorvis that such
awards could be made only if the offensive conduct constituted a
separate “actionable wrong.”76 The Court backed into this difficulty by
asking whether breach of contract, rather than tort, could constitute such
a separate actionable wrong.77
In answering this question, the majority placed emphasis on the fact
that Justice McIntyre chose to use the expression “actionable wrong”78
rather than the term “tort,” which is employed in the Restatement of
Contracts.79 It further noted that the possibility of punitive damages for
breach of contract appeared to have been conceded by the Court in a
subsequent case.80 Moreover, the majority suggested that “the requirement
of an independent tort would unnecessarily complicate the pleadings,
without in most cases adding anything of substance.”81 The majority’s
survey of comparative experience did not observe that in the jurisdictions in
question, including the United States, punitive damages are not typically
awarded in pure breach of contract claims. The recent English Law
Commission recommendation that exemplary or punitive damages ought
not be awarded in the context of contractual breach82 was not referred to,
nor was any response offered to the Commission’s arguments in support
of that recommendation.
Although the Court in Pilot Insurance rejected the restriction observed
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 636.
Id. at 637.
Id. at 638–39.
Id. at 637, 639.
Id. at 639.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 639.
Id.
AGGRAVATED, EXEMPLARY AND RESTITUTIONARY DAMAGES, supra note 7, at 185.
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elsewhere of limiting punitive damages to tortious wrongdoing, the
Court, as we have noted, retained and applied the independent actionable
wrong requirement said to derive from the previous decision of the
Court in Vorvis.83 Thus, in order to grant a punitive damages award on
the facts of Pilot Insurance, it would be necessary to find that, in
addition to the breach of contract constituted by the failure to pay the
claim, a further independent actionable wrong, whether a tort or a breach
of contract, also occurred. In the Court’s view, this requirement was met
on the facts of Pilot Insurance because the defendant’s abominable
behavior constituted a breach of the insurer’s implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing, which requires the insurer to process claims in a prompt
and fair manner.84
As indicated above, the independent “actionable wrong” requirement
appears to stem from a misreading of Justice McIntyre’s reasons in the
Vorvis case. Moreover, no explanation was given for the proposition
that although one single breach of duty suffices for punitive damages in
a tort context, punitive damages in contract require two breaches of duty.
Indeed, it appears that no coherent justification can be offered for the
latter requirement. It thus appears likely that, in due course and in an
appropriate case, Canadian appellate courts, including the Supreme
Court of Canada, will come to the conclusion that the circumstances of a
single breach of contract could be such as to give rise to an appropriate
punitive damages award.
Notwithstanding this inelegant source of continuing analytical difficulty,
the decision in Pilot Insurance plainly establishes a jurisdiction to award
punitive damages in a breach of contract case. The case is also noteworthy,
however, for the Court’s attempt to craft a series of control mechanisms
that will limit such awards, a topic to which we now turn.
III. CONTROL MECHANISMS
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Pilot Insurance is the Court’s attempt to set out an extensive set of
guidelines for both trial judges and appellate courts in order to reign in
and control the potential for excessive punitive damage awards. The
Court essentially identified three different types of guidelines. First, the
Court sought to structure the trial judge’s charge to the jury in a fashion
that would caution, if not ensure, restraint in the making of such
awards.85 Second, the Court indicated that the level of scrutiny that
83.
84.
85.
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appellate courts exercise in reviewing such awards was to be at a higher
level than that normally exercised in supervising damage awards.86
Third, the Court crafted an extensive set of guidelines setting a standard
of “rationality” that punitive damage awards must meet.87
Structuring the Jury Charge. The jury charge that the trial judge gave
in Pilot Insurance was rather sparse. Accordingly, the respondent had
argued that the trial judge had not offered adequate guidance to the
jury.88 While the Court conceded that the trial judge’s charge was,
indeed, “skeletal,”89 it agreed, albeit with “some hesitation,”90 with the
unanimous view of the Court of Appeal below, that the jury charge had
covered the essentials, however lightly. As a general matter, however,
Justice Binnie suggested that the jury charge should not leave the jurors
“to guess what their role and function is.”91 To that end, in his view, it
would be helpful if the jury charge placed emphasis on a number of
points.
First, the exceptional nature of punitive damages should be stressed,
placing emphasis on the usual string of pejoratives identifying conduct
that “departs to a marked degree from ordinary standards of decent
behaviour.”92 Further, the jury should be advised that damages are to be
assessed in an amount “reasonably proportionate to such factors as the
harm caused, the degree of the misconduct, the relative vulnerability of
the plaintiff and any advantage or profit gained by the defendant.”93
Additionally, the jury should be instructed that the purpose of punitive
damages is not to compensate, but rather to give the defendant his or her
just dessert, to deter the defendant and others from similar misconduct in
the future, and to mark the community’s collective condemnation of
what has happened.94 Thus, punitive damages are to be awarded only
where compensatory damages are inadequate, and only in an amount
that is necessary to rationally accomplish these purposes. The jury also
should be plainly told that the plaintiff will keep the punitive damages as

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 649–50.
Id. at 647–49.
Id. at 644.
Id.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 644.
Id. at 645.
Id.
Id.
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a “windfall”95 in addition to compensatory damages, and that judges and
juries in our system of law have usually found that “moderate awards . . .
are generally sufficient.”96 Further, the jury should be advised to have
regard to other fines or penalties suffered by the defendant, and to award
punitive damages only where the misconduct would be otherwise
unpunished or inadequately punished. Although Justice Binnie concluded
by indicating that the use of any particular expression was not obligatory, it
was nonetheless incumbent on the trial judge to “emphasize the nature,
scope and exceptional nature of the remedy, and fairness to both sides.”97
Standard for Appellate Scrutiny. In exercising supervision over
punitive damages awards, the role of appellate courts was envisaged by
the Pilot Insurance majority to be a more muscular one than is exercised
with respect to general damage awards. With respect to the latter, courts
may only intervene if the award is “so exorbitant or so grossly out of
proportion [to the injury] as to shock the court’s conscience and sense of
justice.”98 In the context of punitive damages, however, Justice Binnie
indicated that the emphasis must be on the appellate Court’s obligation
to ensure that the award is the product of reason and rationality. In his
view, “[t]he focus is on whether the court’s sense of reason is offended
rather than on whether its conscience is shocked.”99 As we shall see,
Justice Binnie spelled out in great detail the applicable standard of
review—rationality—in an attempt to set a standard that would
effectively confine the discretion exercised by judge or jury at trial.
What is envisaged, however, is a discretion to award punitive damages
within a range bounded by rationality at either end of the range. The
Canadian Supreme Court did not opt, then, for the type of de novo
appellate review adopted in the modern U.S. authorities.100 We will
return to this point.
Confining the Discretion to Award Punitive Damages. The standard
of rationality to be applied in appellate scrutiny of punitive damage
awards is obviously a device designed to structure and confine the
discretion of judge and jury to award punitive damages at trial. This test
applies both to the threshold question of whether to award punitive
damages at all and to the issue of quantum. With respect to the
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 646.
98. Id. at 649 (quoting Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, 1194).
99. Id. at 650.
100. Cooper Indust., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 443
(2001); see also Lisa Litwiller, Has the Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Jury
Assessed Punitive Damages? A Critical Re-Examination of the American Jury, 36 U.S.F.
L. REV. 411 (2002) (evaluating the appropriate role of the jury in awarding punitive
damages).
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threshold question, it must be considered whether the award of punitive
damages constituted a “rational response” to the defendant’s misconduct.
One must assess whether such an award was rationally required to meet the
objectives served by punitive damages. On the facts of Pilot Insurance,
the Court had little difficulty reaching an affirmative conclusion on this
point. The award had apparently answered the jury’s perceived need for
“retribution, denunciation and deterrence.”101 The Court agreed that this
was “an exceptional case that justified an exceptional remedy.”102
Turning to the question of quantum, however, the Court developed a
much more elaborate set of guidelines to determine “whether a reasonable
jury, properly instructed, could have concluded that an award in that
amount, and no less, was rationally required to punish the defendant’s
misconduct.”103 In determining the critical issue of rationality, the key to
applying that standard rests on a concept of “proportionality.” “A
disproportionate award overshoots its purpose and becomes irrational.”104
In the Court’s view, there are six aspects to the proportionality criterion. First,
the award must be proportionate to the “blameworthiness” of the
defendant’s conduct in the light of such considerations as whether the
misconduct was planned and deliberate, the nature of the defendant’s
motive, its persistence in the conduct, any attempted cover-up or
concealment, awareness of the wrongful nature of the conduct, whether
the defendant profited from the misconduct, and whether the interest
violated by the misconduct was deeply personal to the plaintiff, as, for
example, in the case of injury to the plaintiff’s professional reputation.105
Second, the award must be proportionate to the degree of the
plaintiff’s vulnerability.106 Thus, the fact that the defendant has taken
advantage of a significant power imbalance between the parties will be a
relevant consideration. For this reason, the Court observed that this
factor militates against the award of punitive damages in most commercial
situations.107 Indeed, in the Court’s contemporaneously released decision in
Performance Industries Ltd. v. Sylvan Lake Golf & Tennis Club Ltd.,108 the
Court struck down a punitive damages award of $200,000 in the context of
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 648.
Id. at 649.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
Id. at 652–53.
Id. at 653.
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 678, 679.
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a dispute concerning a proposed real estate development. Although the
defendant’s conduct had been fraudulent and reprehensible, the Court
emphasized that this was a commercial relationship between two
businessmen and, further, that the facts did not reveal an “abuse of a
dominant position.”109 In the particular circumstances, then, neither the
award of punitive damages itself nor the particular quantum met the test of
rationality.110
Third, the award must be proportionate to the actual or potential harm
directed specifically at the plaintiff.111 A punitive damages award would
not be appropriate where the plaintiff was merely a peripheral or minor
victim of the defendant’s wrongdoing. Fourth, the award must be
proportionate to the need for deterrence.112 In fashioning a rational response
to the need for deterrence, it would be appropriate to determine whether the
misconduct in question is typical of the defendant’s conduct in a more
general way. It may also be relevant to consider the “financial power”113 of
the defendant in circumstances where a more substantial award is required,
as a result, to achieve effective deterrence. Thus, the punishment “should
‘sting.’”114 Justice Binnie cautioned, however, that this factor is of limited
importance, and that, as a matter of general practice, the defendant’s
financial worth ought not be mentioned to a jury prior to the liability
determination.115
Fifth, the award must be proportionate in the light of other penalties, both
civil and criminal, to which the defendant has been or will likely be
subject.116 Finally, the award should be proportionate to the advantage
gained or profits made through the misconduct.117 With respect to this latter
point, the Court made no mention that in the context of tortious and other
forms of wrongdoing, an accounting of profits and other similar remedies
would more directly achieve a profit-stripping function.118
In setting out as the standard for appellate review the test that a
reasonable jury, properly instructed, could have concluded that an award
in the amount in question “and no less” was rationally required,119 it may
109. Id. at 712.
110. Id. at 714.
111. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 653–54.
112. Id. at 654–55.
113. Id. at 654.
114. Id. at 655.
115. Id. at 654–55.
116. Id. at 655.
117. Id. at 656.
118. For discussion of this point, see PETER D. MADDAUGH & JOHN D. MCCAMUS,
THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 748–52 (2d ed. 2004).
119. See Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 649 (“[T]he test is whether a reasonable
jury, properly instructed, could have concluded that an award in that amount, and no
less, was rationally required to punish the defendant’s misconduct.”).
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appear that something approximating de novo review is envisaged by the
Court. This, however, does not appear to be the case. In applying the
test to the actual award in Pilot Insurance, Justice Binnie indicated that
although he would not himself have awarded $1 million in punitive
damages on these facts, the award was, nonetheless, “within the rational
limits within which a jury must be allowed to operate.”120 The jury had
been adequately instructed that it should make an award of punitive
damages “if, but only if”121 the award of compensatory damages was
insufficient. “The award was not so disproportionate as to exceed the
bounds of rationality.”122 In response to the defendant’s objection that
prior to this judgment, the highest previous punitive damages award in
an insured bad faith case was $50,000, the Court observed that “[o]ne of
the strengths of the jury system is that it keeps the law in touch with
evolving realities, including financial realities.”123
IV. THE AFTERMATH
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Pilot Insurance
case is obviously a remarkable one for a number of reasons. Although
the Court recognized the potential availability of punitive damages in the
contractual context several years earlier in the Vorvis case, Pilot
Insurance is the first decision in which it approved a punitive damages
award that, at least to a Canadian observer, looks more American in its
quantum than its predecessors. In the absence of empirical study of the
decision’s practical effects, one may nonetheless confidently predict that
the decision has provoked greater frequency in the pleading of claims for
substantial punitive damages awards. At the same time, however, the
practical impact of the court-fashioned control mechanisms to limit such
awards can only be the subject of speculation.
Nonetheless, there is at least some evidence in recent appellate
decisions that Canadian courts will indeed exercise the supervisory
jurisdiction committed to them by the Pilot Insurance decision. Two
recent decisions by the Ontario Court of Appeal are of interest. In
Ferme Gérald Laplante & Fils Ltée v. Grenville Patron Mutual Fire
Insurance Co.,124 the court reversed a jury award of punitive damages in
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 658.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661–62.
[2002] 217 D.L.R. (4th) 34 (Ont. C.A.).
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another insurer bad faith case. Following upon a fire at the plaintiff’s
farm, a hard fought dispute took place between the plaintiff farmer and
the defendant insurer. By the time of trial, although the insurer had already
paid out to the plaintiff $1.17 million, a number of disputed items remained.
The jury awarded an additional $488,389 in compensatory damages and
$750,000 in punitive damages.125 The Court of Appeal held that although
the jury could have found that a breach of the good faith duty had
occurred, the jury could not rationally have concluded that an award of
punitive damages was required to punish the defendant’s misconduct.126
Similarly, in a wrongful dismissal case, Prinzo v. Baycrest Centre for
Geriatric Care, the court set aside a $5,000 award for punitive damages.127
Even though the employer’s treatment of the plaintiff at the time of
dismissal had amounted to the tort of intentional infliction of mental
suffering, an award of damages for mental distress had effectively
compensated for the wrong. Accordingly, in the court’s view, an award
of punitive damages was not necessary for deterrence purposes and
served no rational purpose.128 Although the same court upheld a substantial
punitive damages award in another case,129 at least for the moment, such
decisions offer some comfort to those observers who worry that Pilot
Insurance has indeed introduced an Americanization of the punitive
damages awards in common law Canada.
V. THE PERCEIVED NEED OR ROLE
Although the Supreme Court of Canada offers an extensive and
scholarly analysis of the history, comparative experience, and the means
of structuring punitive damages awards, there is one glaring omission in
its opinion. Mainly, this omission stems from the absence of a careful
assessment of whether there is a need or a clear role for the punitive
damages concept in the context of pure or mere breaches of contract.
The early experience strongly suggests that the claims for punitive
damages of this kind will arise principally in the context of bad faith
insurance claims, and claims for wrongful dismissal in circumstances
where the employer has coupled dismissal with an imputation, other bad
faith, or abusive conduct. Consequently, in assessing the contribution
made by Pilot Insurance,130 it may be useful to consider briefly the prior
125. Id. at 36–37.
126. Id. at 35.
127. [2002] 60 O.R. (3d) 474, 475 (C.A.).
128. Id. at 475–76.
129. See Khazzaka v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. of Can., [2002] 66 O.R.
(3d) 390 (C.A.) (representing a case with facts similar to Pilot Insurance Co. and
decision upholding jury award of $200,000 in punitive damages).
130. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595.
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Canadian law concerning punitive damages as it might apply in these
two contexts. Further, as punitive damages claims often arise in the
context of abusive treatment that may potentially cause psychological
stress or injury, it will also be useful to briefly consider the availability
of compensation for such injuries in these contexts.
With respect to punitive damages, it is well-established Canadian law
that punitive damages are not narrowly restricted to the two categories of
tort claims that the House of Lords identified in Rookes v. Barnard.131
Punitive damages are generally available in the context of tort claims
and, more particularly, in the context of negligence claims, provided that
the negligence exhibits a degree of callousness that warrants a punitive
damages award. In the leading case of Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey
Club Ltd.,132 the plaintiff was a professional hockey player who suffered
a serious spinal injury that was misdiagnosed by the defending team’s
physician. After an initial injury, the team’s management ignored
Robitaille’s request for medical treatment, considered his continuing
complaints concerning symptoms unfounded, and pressured the plaintiff
to continue playing by threats of suspension. In a subsequent game,
Robitaille was further injured and suffered a permanent and disabling
spinal cord injury.133 The British Columbia Court of Appeal upheld a
punitive damages award at trial on the basis that the defendant’s
negligence was “such as to merit condemnation.”134 Although the test
for the availability of punitive damages in a tort context has been
variously stated, the Supreme Court emphasized in Norberg v. Wynrib135
that it was not necessary to meet the threshold of “harsh, vindictive or
malicious” conduct suggested in Vorvis,136 but it was sufficient to
establish that the conduct was “reprehensible and it was of a type to
offend the ordinary standards of decent conduct in the community.”137
Turning to damages for mental distress resulting from contractual
breach, the position under traditional Canadian and English common law
doctrine was that such damages were not available. In the latter part of
131. Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129 (H.L.).
132. [1981] 124 D.L.R. (3d) 228 (B.C.C.A.); see also A. v. Bottril, [2003] 1 A.C.
449 (P.C.) (providing that inadvertent negligence can give rise to punitive damages
where the conduct is so outrageous as to warrant condemnation and punishment).
133. Robitaille, 124 D.L.R. (3d) at 229–32.
134. Id. at 251.
135. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226.
136. Id. at 268.
137. Id.
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the twentieth century, however, English and then Canadian courts
recognized claims of this kind. The leading English case, Jarvis v.
Swans Tours Ltd.,138 is a classroom favorite in which a solicitor’s high
hopes for a pleasurable two-week Swiss vacation—fueled by claims
made in the defendant’s brochure—were dashed when virtually all of the
advertised virtues of the experience proved to be either nonexistent or
below par. The Court of Appeal awarded damages for the resulting mental
aggravation.139 The nature of this case and subsequent authorities provided
a basis for the conclusion that at least in English law, such claims were
restricted to contractual contexts in which the object of the agreement
was to provide a pleasurable experience, or, at least, to ensure one’s
peace of mind.140
The House of Lords recently clarified the English doctrine on this
point in Farley v. Skinner.141 The plaintiff, a prospective purchaser of a
country property, retained the defendant surveyor to inspect the property
and, inter alia, asked him to investigate whether the property would be
seriously affected by aircraft noise given its proximity to Gatwick
International Airport. Reassured on the latter point by the defendant, the
plaintiff acquired the property and, upon moving in, discovered that the
defendant’s advice on this point was seriously in error. The purchaser
brought a claim for non-pecuniary damages for the loss of tranquility
resulting from the substantial presence of aircraft noise on the property.
The defendant argued in response that such damages could only be
claimed where the very object of the contract is to provide pleasure,
relaxation, or peace of mind, and that a contract with a surveyor to
inspect a property did not come within that category of agreements.142
The House of Lords allowed the claim, however, on the basis that it was
sufficient if “a major or important object of the contract is to give
pleasure, relaxation or peace of mind.”143 Thus, in this case, where the
contract to inspect included a particular undertaking concerning airplane
138. [1973] Q.B. 233 (C.A. 1972).
139. Id.
140. Thus, claims have been allowed against solicitors whose failure to provide
service at a reasonable level of skill and care forseeably caused mental distress to the
client. See, e.g., Heywood v. Wellers, [1976] Q.B. 446, 447 (C.A. 1975) (representing
mishandled attempt on behalf of female client to restrain a man from molesting her);
Hamilton Jones v. David & Snape (a firm), [2004] 1 All E.R. 657, 658 (Ch. 2003)
(illustrating negligent failure to prevent removal of client’s children from jurisdiction);
see also P.A. Wournell Contracting Ltd. v. Allen, [1979] 100 D.L.R. (3d) 62 (N.S.T.D.)
(involving solicitor’s failure to incorporate company), rev’d on other grounds, [1980]
108 D.L.R. (3d) 723 (N.S.C.A.); Boudreau v. Benaiah, [2000] 182 D.L.R. (4th) 569
(Ont. C.A.) (conducting negligent defense of criminal charges).
141. [2001] 4 All E.R. 801 (H.L.).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 812.
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noise that had such an object, damages for consequential mental distress
were available.
In Canada, however, it is unlikely that even this limitation exists on
the availability of damages for mental distress. Canadian courts have
applied the Jarvis doctrine in cases in which the agreements breached
cannot be characterized as providing for pleasure or peace of mind.144
They have also accepted that the Jarvis doctrine may apply in the
context of wrongful dismissal cases,145 though in Vorvis,146 the majority
of the court emphasized that, as with punitive damages, it was necessary
to find that the mental injury resulted from an independently actionable
wrong. In this context, the purport of the opinion is simply to suggest
that where the mental injury results from the employer behavior
preceding the wrongful dismissal, it is necessary to show that the
employer’s behavior is itself actionable.
In dissent, Justice Wilson stated perhaps more accurately the governing
Canadian principle to the effect that “aggravated damages for mental
suffering may be awarded in breach of contract cases . . . [where] the
parties should reasonably have foreseen mental suffering as a consequence
of a breach of the contract at the time the contract was entered into.”147
On this view, presumably, the English requirement that the contract
contain at least one aspect designed to provide pleasure or peace of mind
is considered to be simply a proxy for the reasonable foreseeability test.
Accordingly, there is no compelling reason not to simply apply the test
itself. In Vorvis, Justice Wilson appears to have accepted that the
manner of wrongfully dismissing an employee might give rise to a claim
of this kind.148
144. See, e.g., Zuker v. Paul, [1982] 135 D.L.R. (3d) 481, 481–82 (Ont. Div.
Ct.) (representing breach of warranty of title to automobile); Taylor v. Gill, [1991] 3
W.W.R. 727 (Alta Q.B.) (involving noncompletion of sale of residential premises);
Gourlay v. Osmond, [1991] 104 N.S.R.2d 155 (Trial Div.) (involving noncompletion of
purchase of residential premises); Kempling v. Hearthstone Manor Corp., [1996]
137 D.L.R. (4th) 12 (Alta. C.A.) (involving noncompletion of sale of condominium
unit).
145. See, e.g., Brown v. Waterloo Reg’l Bd, of Comm’rs of Police, [1983] 150
D.L.R. (3d) 729 (Ont. C.A.) (stating that damages for mental distress could be awarded
where reasonably foreseeable consequence of dismissal); see also Kopij v. Metro.
Toronto (Municipality), [1996] 29 O.R. (3d) 752 (General Div.) (holding damages
available for mental distress where violation of procedural fairness in dismissal is
negligent and where distress is reasonably foreseeable).
146. Vorvis v. Ins Corp., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085.
147. Id. at 1113–14.
148. Id. at 1118.
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Applying these principles, first, to the context of bad faith insurance
claims, it is not at all obvious that the recognition of punitive damages
for pure breach of contract was necessary in order to bring about the
result achieved in Pilot Insurance. Indeed, it is not obvious that the
doctrine pronounced in Pilot Insurance was correctly applied to the facts
of that case. Under prior Canadian law, it is clear the defendant insurer
would be vulnerable to a claim for punitive damages if its conduct had
been tortious. Although no finding on this point was made by the Court,
there can be little doubt that Pilot Insurance had committed a tort.
Even if one accepts the position taken by its representatives that
they genuinely believed that Mrs. Whiten had committed arson,149 their
conduct appeared negligent. Further, the conduct would appear to meet
the threshold set out in Robitaille,150 requiring manifestation of a callous
disregard for the plaintiff’s interests.151
If this is correct, it then follows that the entire discussion of the
punitive damages awards for pure breach of contract is simply
unnecessary to the decision in the Pilot Insurance case. More generally,
there is very little basis for thinking that punitive damages should have a
role to play in circumstances where an insurer is guilty of lesser forms of
wrongdoing. If the insurer had merely engaged in negligent conduct
which did not manifest a callous disregard for the interests of the
insured, even the Pilot Insurance Court would not likely have awarded
punitive damages. Further, it is all the more unlikely that such an
award would be made in a case where the insurer’s conduct fell short
of negligence but nonetheless exposed the insurer to liability for mere
breach of the implied covenant to process claim in good faith.
Therefore, apart from cases already covered by the Robitaille principle,
the role for punitive damages for pure breach of contract in bad faith
insurance cases, as a practical matter, appears to be very limited, if not
nonexistent.
When one considers the application of the aggravated or mental
distress damages line of authority to the Pilot Insurance fact situation, it
seems doubtful that the Pilot Insurance principle itself was properly
applied to the facts of that case. Prior to Pilot Insurance, Canadian law
has clearly established that damages for mental distress may be awarded
in a case where the mental distress results from bad faith conduct of an
insurer in the course of processing a plaintiff’s claim.152 Curiously, in
149. Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 612.
150. Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd., [1981] 124 D.L.R. (3d) 228
(B.C.C.A.).
151. Id. at 248.
152. See, e.g., Warrington v. Great-West Life Assurance Co., [1996] 139 D.L.R.
(4th) 18 (B.C.C.A.) (holding that where there is a persistent refusal to pay disability

1514

MCCAMUS.DOC

[VOL. 41: 1491, 2004]

8/21/2019 11:56 AM

Prometheus Bound or Loose Cannon?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Pilot Insurance, no claim for aggravated damages to compensate Mrs.
Whiten for her undoubted mental distress was advanced. It is unclear
why this was the case. Even an unusually resilient personality would
have suffered a great deal of distress as a result of the abysmal treatment
that the defendant insurer afforded to the Whitens. Their distress was
surely many times more severe than the level of anxiety suffered by
solicitor Jarvis as a result of his disappointing Swiss vacation,153 and a
substantial award on this basis would appear warranted. Thus, it is not
actually correct to suggest, as the Supreme Court suggested in Pilot
Insurance, that the Pilot Insurance jury applied its collective mind to the
question of whether punitive damages should be awarded “if but only
if,” compensatory damages were insufficient to meet the needs of the
situation.154 The whole range of compensatory damages was simply not
considered by the jury.
Thus, the Pilot Insurance principle itself appears to have been
misapplied. It is possible, of course, that the Pilot Insurance jury might
have awarded punitive damages on top of a substantial award for mental
distress. It is of interest, however, that in Prinzo,155 noted above, the
Ontario Court of Appeal overturned an award for punitive damages at
trial on the basis that the misconduct in question had resulted in an
award of damages for the plaintiff’s resulting mental distress and,
accordingly, a further award of punitive damages “[was] not necessary
for deterrence purposes . . . [and therefore] serve[d] no rational purpose.”156
It might well be, then, that the Pilot Insurance jury, if properly
instructed, might have made a substantial award for damages for mental
distress and come to a similar conclusion. Therefore, the practical
application of the Pilot Insurance doctrine of punitive damages for pure
breach of contract may be severely limited.
benefits, damages will be awarded for reasonably foreseeable mental distress); McIsaac
v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., [1999] 173 D.L.R. (4th) 649 (B.C.C.A.) (holding that
mental distress resulting from refusal to pay benefits under disability insurance
compensable as such a contract is to provide “peace of mind”); Eddie v. Unum Life Ins.
Co. of Am., [1999] 177 D.L.R. (4th) 738 (B.C.C.A.) (holding that insurer made no
reasonable effort to assess medical condition before refusing disability benefits and
awarding damages for mental distress); Clarfield v. Crown Life Ins. Co., [2000] 50 O.R.
(3d) 696 (Sup. C.J.) (holding that delay in handling and rejection of disability claim
relating to mental illness rendered damages for resulting anxiety recoverable).
153. Jarvis v. Swans Tours Ltd., [1973] Q.B. 233 (C.A. 1972).
154. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. at 658.
155. Prinzo v. Baycrest Centre for Geriatric Care, [2002] 60 O.R. (3d) 474 (C.A.).
156. Id. at 498.
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The Pilot Insurance court also offers little guidance as to what role
punitive damages should play in the bad faith insurance context at an
institutional level. Is the punitive damages award meant to be a device
to fill the gaps in the enforcement activities of the insurance regulators?
Are punitive damages to be awarded in larger measure or more
frequently in contexts in which the wrongdoing of the insurer appears to
be of a systemic nature? In such cases, should a plaintiff such as Mrs.
Whiten recover all of the appropriate fine, or should the bringing of a
representative claim be a precondition for recovery of the entire amount
in provinces that have modern class actions legislation?
The Pilot Insurance Court barely hints at answers to important
questions of this sort. The Pilot Insurance Court did not openly address
systemic issues. It appeared to accept the finding at trial that “there is no
evidence this case represents a deliberate corporate strategy as opposed
to an isolated, mishandled file that ran amok.”157 On the other hand, the
Court went on to observe that “Pilot declined to call evidence to explain
why this file ran amok, and what steps, if any, have been taken to
prevent a recurrence.”158 We are left to assume that such evidence might
have resulted in a reduction of the punitive damages award. Further, the
Court’s response to the submissions of the intervening industry
representative, the Insurance Council of Canada, hints at judicial
skepticism concerning industry practice and the regulation thereof. The
Council submitted that the disciplining of the insurance industry should
be left to the provincial regulators.159 Justice Binnie replied that nothing
in the appeal record indicated that the regulator “took an interest in this
case prior to the jury’s unexpectedly high award of punitive damages.”160
Further, the Court observed that, to the extent that a defendant had
otherwise suffered punishment, either civil or criminal, for the misconduct
in question, “the need for additional punishment in the case before the
court [was] lessened and [might] be eliminated.”161 Although such remarks
are perhaps suggestive of the Court’s interest in broader systemic issues,
the role of punitive damages in attacking systemic problems in the
insurance industry, for example, is not explicitly identified as a function
of the doctrine nor are the implications of deploying the doctrine in this
fashion addressed by the Court.
When one considers the application of prior punitive damages law and
the law of compensation for mental distress in the context of wrongful
dismissal, Canadian law is, as we have seen, in something of a state of
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
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disarray. With respect to punitive damages, subsequent interpretations
of the Vorvis decision, confirmed by Justice Binnie in Pilot Insurance,162
have adopted the curious position that punitive damages may be awarded
for breach of contract only where a second breach of contract or tort has
occurred, in addition to the principal breach of contract with respect to
which the claim has been advanced.163
As far as claims for mental distress damages resulting from wrongful
dismissal are concerned, subsequent interpretations of the Vorvis
decision have created a similar point of difficulty. Canadian courts have
generally accepted that damages for mental distress cannot be awarded
unless there exists an independent and actionable second wrong.164
Without doubt, the real reason why Justice McIntyre in Vorvis required a
separate actionable wrong,165 as he attempted to explain, was that the
failure to give reasonable notice constituting the breach was not itself
likely to either cause mental distress or be sufficiently heinous to
provide a basis for the punitive damages award. The allegedly wrongful
act in Vorvis was not the giving of insufficient notice but, rather, the
careful supervision or, from the employee’s perspective, the harassment
that preceded his dismissal. Justice McIntyre’s point, then, was that the
conduct complained of must itself constitute a breach of a contractual or
tortious duty. If the law of wrongful dismissal has arrived at an
unsatisfactory state in Canadian law, however, we may note that nothing
in the Pilot Insurance decision appears to resolve the difficulty. It
unhelpfully preserves the independent actionable wrong requirement for
punitive damages. It offers no guidance with respect to damages for
mental distress.
If the apparent inability of Canadian courts to award the damages for
mental distress, relating to the manner in which the decision to dismiss is
162. Id. at 637–41.
163. The Supreme Court itself confirmed this point in McKinley v. BC Tel., [2001]
200 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 416–17 (Can.); see also Beaird v. Westinghouse Can. Inc., [1999]
43 O.R. (3d) 581, 591–92 (C.A.); Noseworthy v. Riverside Pontiac-Buick Ltd., [1998]
168 D.L.R. (4th) 629 (Ont. C.A.); Marshall v. Watson Wyatt & Co., [2002] 57 O.R. (3d)
813, 828 (C.A.); cf. Francis v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, [1994] 21 O.R.
(3d) 75 (C.A.).
164. See Wurster v. Universal Envtl. Servs. Inc., [1998] 167 D.L.R. (4th) 166 (Ont.
C.A.) (holding that alleged mistreatment prior to the decision to dismiss is not an
independent actionable wrong); Noseworthy, [1998] 168 D.L.R. (4th) 629 (holding that
dismissal accompanied by unfounded accusations of misconduct is not an independent
actionable wrong).
165. Vorvis v. Ins. Corp., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1085, 1106.
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communicated, is considered problematic, the most coherent solution to
the problem would be, as Justice McLachlin suggested in her dissenting
opinion in Wallace, to imply a term not to engage in bad faith conduct in
the course of dismissing an employee.166 Presumably, on the reasoning
in Pilot Insurance, the breach of such a term could give rise to a claim
for punitive damages. Certainly, it could give rise to a claim for damages
for mental distress. As we have seen, however, the majority in Wallace
rejected this approach and favored the surprising view that where a
dismissal is conducted in a bad faith manner, the period of reasonable
notice may be extended. Since the misconduct, according to the majority
view, does not constitute a breach of a contractual term, punitive damages
are presumably unavailable. The important point for present purposes,
however, is that the approach adopted in Pilot Insurance with respect to
punitive damages would appear to have no impact on, or practical
application within, the context of wrongful dismissal cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recognition of the availability of punitive damages for pure breach of
contract by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Pilot Insurance case is,
at best, a mixed blessing for Canadian law. On the positive side of the
balance, the decision crafts a set of controls to be employed by trial
judges and appellate courts in both restricting the frequency of such
awards and controlling their quantum. The principal devices set out in
the opinion are elaborate instructions to be administered by trial judges
to juries and, no doubt, to themselves, and the assertion of a jurisdiction
to review such awards and their quantum on appellate review on the
basis of a rationality test. Of these two devices, the latter is the most
likely to enjoy success.167
Accordingly, it is regrettable that the Court did not opt for de novo
166. Wallace v. United Grain Growers Ltd., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 701, 748–49.
167. For an account of experimental studies offering discouraging evidence of the
ability and/or willingness of juries to follow even rather precise instructions on how to
calculate punitive damages, see W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail to
Promote Efficiency, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 139 (2002) (advancing the thesis that the
nature of the task in awarding a specific dollar amount for punitive damages is poorly
designed and one that juries cannot be expected to perform well and reviewing possible
reforms). See also Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on
Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2074 (1998) (concluding that in
personal injury cases juries often struggle with converting their moral judgments into
dollar figures); David A. Schkade, Erratic by Design: A Task Analysis of Punitive
Damages Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 121 (2002) (reporting that two experimental
studies indicate that (1) mock jurors punish companies who have balanced risk of harm
against cost of safety in manufacturing products, and (2) mock jurors are unable or
unwilling to follow a set of model jury instructions designed to produce efficient damage
awards).
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review at the appellate level. Such review would not only constitute a
more effective controlling device, it might conduce to greater uniformity
in the making of awards. Further, it may be considered a somewhat
backhanded compliment to the decision to suggest that if the analysis set
out in this article is correct, the decision is not likely to be of much
practical effect in increasing the frequency of punitive damage awards,
at least in the contexts of bad faith insurance and wrongful dismissal
cases. One might take the view that the punitive damages in contract cat
was let out of the bag when Canadian courts determined to allow such
damages in the context of negligent misconduct, albeit misconduct
which meets the requisite threshold of callousness.168 Indeed, punitive
damages could have been awarded in Pilot Insurance on the basis of this
principle. Further, it has been suggested above that even after Pilot
Insurance, it is unlikely that punitive damages will be awarded in bad
faith insurance cases that would not be captured by the same principle.
The net effect of Pilot Insurance may therefore be to provide clearer
means for appellate control of the punitive damages award at trial.
For those who see the awarding of punitive damages in civil cases as
nothing other than an inappropriate confusion of the purposes of
criminal and civil law, the Pilot Insurance decision’s contribution is
irredeemably negative. The fact that Justice Binnie, on behalf of the
Pilot Insurance court, refers to the defendant insurer’s misconduct as
“the offence”169 may not surprise such observers. Those who have
greater tolerance for punitive damage awards in contract cases may
nonetheless find the Pilot Insurance decision disturbing. The amount of
the award—blessed by the Court as within the limits of rationality—is
impressively large to Canadian observers. Moreover, even if one
accepts the analysis set out above concerning bad faith insurance and
wrongful dismissal claims, it is quite possible that trial judges and juries
will employ Pilot Insurance to expand the role of punitive damages in
other contractual settings. For those who, like myself, see little merit in
extending the scope of punitive damages in the contract context beyond
cases of breach of contract that also constitute tortious wrongdoing, the
decision disappoints by failing to supply a convincing reason for making
such an extension.
168. See Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey Club Ltd., [1981] 124 D.L.R. (3d) 228
(B.C.C.A.) (awarding punitive damages for negligent failure to provide adequate medical
treatment of hockey player).
169. Whiten v. Pilot Ins. Co., [2002] 1 S.C.R. 595, 659.
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Moreover, it is certainly the case that the Pilot Insurance court does
not offer a view of the institutional role that punitive damages should
play in, for example, the bad faith insurance context. It is arguable that
courts are neither well equipped nor well advised to attempt to regulate
the insurance industry through the awarding of punitive damages.170 Be
this as it may, it is clearly the case that the Pilot Insurance court took the
plunge of recognizing punitive damages for pure breach of contract
without any indication of the consequences of doing so at the level of
institutional design. Nor did the court consider the relevance of systemic
issues within the industry in question with respect to the awarding of
punitive damages in a particular case and with respect to issues of
quantum. On matters such as these, Canadian courts will no doubt be
looking southward in the years to come for inspiration and wisdom.

170. For a clear statement of the view that they are neither, see John Swan, Punitive
Damages for Breach of Contract: A Remedy in Search of a Justification, 29 QUEEN’S
L.J. 596, 628–34 (2004).
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